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Self-Determined Citizens? New Forms of Civic Activism and 
Citizenship in Armenia  
By Armine Ishkanian  
Abstract 
This article examines the recent emergence and growth of grassroots social movements in 
Armenia which are locally known as ‘civic initiatives’. It considers what their emergence 
tells us about the development of civil society and the changing  understandings and 
practices of citizenship in Armenia in the post-Soviet period. It analyses why civic 
initiatives explicitly reject and distance themselves from formal, professionalised NGOs 
and what new models of civic activism and citizenship they have introduced. It argues 
that civic initiatives embrace a more political understanding of civil society than that 







Within the context of the post-socialist transitions1, civil society building was 
considered both as a means as well as an end to achieving democracy. Two decades after 
the collapse of the socialist regimes in Central and East Europe and the Soviet Union, 
there is a large and growing body of literature which critically examines the impact of 
externally funded democracy promotion and civil society building programmes in the 
former socialist countries (Morlino and Sadurski, 2010, Mandel, 2012, Bojicic-Dzelilovic 
et al., 2013, Lutsevych, 2013, Schimmelfennig et al., 2014). The instrumentalisation, or 
what some call the NGO-isation, of civil society in the 1980s and 1990s in both the 
former socialist transition countries as well as in developing countries more generally, 
has been well documented (Howell and Pearce, 2001, Pearce, 2010, Petras, 1997, 
Schuller, 2009). Scholars writing about civil society in the former socialist countries have 
argued that in the 1990s, civil society was turned into a ‘project’ (Sampson, 1996) and 
that professionalised non-governmental organisations [NGOs], which were the main 
outcome of that transition era ‘project’, are locally perceived as donor driven, upwardly 
accountable, and disconnected from their own communities and constituencies 
(Babajanian, 2005, Greenberg, 2010, Hann, 2002, Hemment, 2004, Henderson, 2003, 
Mendelson and Glenn, 2003, Bojicic-Dzelilovic et al., 2013). 
Despite the substantial investment of human and financial resources in civil 
society promotion and democracy building from Western donors (Carothers, 1999, 
                                                 
1 The term “transition” has been problematized by various scholars including Michael Buroway and Katherine Verdery (BURAWOY, 
M. K. V. (Ed.) (1999) Uncertain Transitions: Ethnographies of Change in the Postsocialist World, Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers Inc.  who argue that “transition” implies an evolutionary development that has a single, well-defined objective 
and trajectory. While I agree with this assessment, I have chosen to use the term ‘transition’ for the sake of simplicity and because the 
term continues to be applied to the region by a number of international organizations including the World Bank and the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
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Hansen, 1996, Simao, 2012, Finkel et al., 2006), when active civil societies and 
democratic regimes did not emerge, some policy makers attributed the failure to the 
Soviet legacy (Evans Jr., 2006, Mandel, 2002) or the ‘cultural or political shortcomings’ 
of the recipients of the democracy aid (Greenberg 2010: 46), rather than the normative 
model of civil society which was promoted. Today, across the former socialist countries, 
we find that those civil society groups, including nationalist organizations, veterans 
groups, and others, which were ignored or marginalized by donors, have come to view 
themselves as the real civil society in contrast to the donor created and supported NGOs 
(Schwandner-Sievers, 2013, Hemment, 2012, Strazzari and Selenica, 2013). However, in 
addition to the aforementioned groups, since the late 2000s, new grassroots citizens’ 
movements, which also distinguish themselves from professionalised, Western funded 
NGOs, have begun emerging in a number of former Soviet countries including Armenia, 
Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine (Evans, 2012, Lutsevych, 2013, Niktin, 2010, 
Kokichaishvili, 2012, Stop Destroying Gudiashvili Square, 2011, Faryna, 2012).  
In this article, focusing on Armenia, I examine and analyse the emergence of 
grassroots citizens’ movements which are locally known as ‘civic initiatives’ 
(kakhakatsiakan nakhatsernutyunner) and consider what the emergence of civic 
initiatives tells us about the development of civil society and changing  understandings 
and practices of civic activism and citizenship in the post-Soviet period. I focus on 
environmental civic initiatives because they have been the most active in recent years, but 
my findings and analysis also apply to civic initiatives addressing other, non-
environmental issues (Glasius and Ishkanian, forthcoming). While, as I shall demonstrate, 
there are ‘behind the scenes’ links to professionalised NGOs, I ask why civic initiatives 
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explicitly reject and distance themselves from formal, professionalised NGOs or what 
they call ‘traditional’ (avanatagan) civil society organisations and what new 
understandings and practices of civic activism and citizenship have they introduced?  In 
my analysis I also examine whether civic initiatives have been able to influence wider 
socio-political developments in Armenia. 
 Ever since the first civic initiative, Save Teghut Forest, was formed in 2007, the 
numbers and types of civic initiatives have grown [see Table 1]. Civic initiatives in 
Armenia address a range of issues including the environment, cultural preservation, 
consumer rights, labour and employment issues, as well as human rights [see Graph 1]. 
Civic initiatives in Armenia are distinct from formal, professionalized NGOs in a number 
of key aspects including the issues they address; their organizational structures; their 
repertories of action; and their lack of engagement with foreign donors. The age range of 
the participants is between 20 – 45 years of age, with the most active participants being in 
their mid-20s – mid- 30s. Most participants are middle class, educated, young 
professionals or university students, some of whom have studied abroad. Civic initiatives 
usually consist of between twenty to  several hundred individuals (in rare instances) who 
come together to collectively raise awareness of and to address a particular issue. 
Decision-making within civic initiatives is consensus-based with discussions occurring in 
person, over email, or in private Facebook groups. Horizontality is valued and active 
participation of all members is encouraged. While traditional NGO advocacy is 
structured, non-confrontational, technocratic and expert-based, civic initiatives utilize 
different repertories of action that rely on street-based demonstrations, occupations, as 
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well as creative forms of direct action such as flash mobs, concerts, theatrical 
performances, and art or photography exhibitions. 
I argue that although environmental civic initiatives in Armenia address very 
specific and sometimes narrowly focused issues (e.g., saving a waterfall, public park, 
etc.), their emergence is informed by and is an articulation of much broader concerns 
around corruption, the absence of rule of law, the lack of democracy, the rise of oligarchic 
capitalism, and the failure of formal political elites to address the concerns of ordinary 
Armenian citizens. I maintain that the activists involved in civic initiatives, disillusioned 
with the lack of action and resistance to perceived social injustices by both political 
parties and formal, professionalised NGOs, are embracing a more political understanding 
of civil society than that which was introduced by Western donors in the 1990s. The 
activists, I contend are not only rejecting NGO models of advocacy and campaigning, but 
that they are also introducing new understandings of civil society and practices of civic 
activism. The individuals involved in civic initiatives describe their activism as a form of 
‘self-determined’ citizenship and place great emphasis on independence, solidarity, and 
self-organisation. They conceptualise citizenship to mean that individuals have rights as 
well as responsibilities toward their communities and their country and as such, they 
encourage people to become the ‘owners’ [derer] of their country and active subjects 
rather than passive and silent bystanders in society who privately complain about 
problems, but do not take any public action to change things.  
As I will demonstrate, since 2010, environmental civic initiatives have introduced 
new understandings and practices of citizenship and civic activism and opened up 
discussions, debates and public deliberations around specific issues (e.g., the use of 
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public space for private gain and mining) as well as governance, corruption, the rule of 
law and accountability and transparency in policy processes more broadly. They have 
also achieved small, but symbolically significant victories including halting the 
demolition of a public park and preserving a waterfall. More recently, non-environmental 
civic initiatives have prevented transport fee hikes (the 100 Dram civic initiative - August 
2013) and temporarily halted the Government’s plans for privatising pensions (the Dem 
Em [I am Against] civic initiative – October 2013 - March 2014). Although these 
victories have inspired participants and brought them greater public attention and added 
to their numbers and supporters in Yerevan, civic initiatives have thus far not been able to 
widen participation beyond the capital nor, more significantly, have they been able to 
achieve structural changes or had an impact on addressing politically sensitive issues 
such as violence in the army or mining [see Graph 2]. However, if we move away from 
what Castells calls the ‘productivist vision of social action’ (i.e., that if no concrete policy 
impact is accomplished, there is failure) (Castells, 2012: 143), then we can see that 
although civic initiatives have as yet to achieve any significant structural or institutional 
level changes, they have introduced new understandings of civil society and citizenship 
and civic activism and it remains to be seen how they will develop in coming years. 
Methodology  
This article is based on extensive field research conducted in Armenia in three 
separate visits: September 2011, May 2012, and October 2012. The  majority of 
interviews were conducted in person, but a few interviews were conducted over Skype. 
All interviews were recorded and transcribed. The respondents’ names have been 
anonymised and they are referred to using pseudonyms. The findings in this article are 
based on eighty-five individual interviews with the following:  civic activists from three 
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environmental civic initiatives: Save Teghut (2007 – present), Protect Trchkan Waterfall 
(2011) and Save Mashtots Park (2012); representatives of environmental and human 
rights NGOs; diaspora activists who support environmental initiatives and campaigns in 
Armenia; journalists and bloggers who cover ecological issues; academics; and 
representatives from donor organisations. Additionally, my research team and I organised 
sixteen focus groups. Of the sixteen focus groups, seven were held in different 
communities in Yerevan and the remaining nine were held in cities and villages in the 
Ararat, Lori, Shirak, and Syunik regions. In addition, I conducted an extensive review of 
relevant Armenian press articles from 2007 – 2012, Armenian NGO and think tank 
publications, and relevant Facebook groups’ pages in order to understand the broader 
discourses and discussions. 
In this article, I primarily focus on the Protect Trchkan Waterfall and Save 
Mashtots Park civic initiatives for the following reasons. First, they have a distinct 
beginning and end (i.e., they are not on-going like the Save Teghut civic initiative). 
Second, they have achieved a significant part of their stated aims and finally, as these two 
civic initiatives were highly publicized on Facebook and independent internet new 
websites, this allowed me to supplement and triangulate my interviews with published 
sources. 
Civil Society, Citizenship and Individual Agency 
Prior to the 1980s, civil society was rarely invoked as an analytical concept or as a 
mobilizing discourse and it was dissident intellectuals in Eastern Europe who revitalized 
the concept in the 1980s to express their resistance to authoritarian rule and their 
aspirations for a more democratic polity with a continued role for state regulation 
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(Edwards and Foley, 2001, Howell and Pearce, 2001, Keane, 1988). Following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, civil society 
rose in prominence within policy circles and international development agencies 
absorbed and appropriated the idea of civil society into their discourses and policies 
subsequently making it a central part of their aid programmes to the former socialist 
countries and indeed in developing countries across the globe. The euphoria for civil 
society arose, Howell and Pearce argue (2002), out of a combination of factors including 
the growing disillusion of Western governments and donors with state-led development, 
and  the ascendancy of the neo-liberal paradigm of New Public Management, which 
supported the roll-back of the state and the privatization of social service delivery. While 
there is much debate over the meaning of civil society, here I use Cohen and Arato’s 
formulation which defines civil society as ‘a sphere of social interaction between 
economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially family), the 
sphere of associations (especially voluntary organisations), social movements and forms 
of public communication’ (Cohen and Arato, 1992: ix). 
Although Alexis de Tocqueville did not use the term civil society, he was the first 
to attribute the importance of associationalism and self-organisation for democracy 
(Kaldor 2003: 19). The post-socialist civil society building programmes of the 1990s 
were strongly influenced by the writings of neo-Tocquevillian scholars, such as Putnam, 
who posited that democracy is strengthened when it faces a vigorous civil society 
(Diamond, 1999, Putnam, 1994, Rueschemeyer et al., 1992, Lovell, 1991) and argued 
that civil society organisations would play a major role in building citizenship skills and 
trust and could also take over many of the functions of the state (Edwards and Foley, 
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2001: 5). While the neo-Tocquevillian theories linking civil society to democracy became 
a key element of the post-Cold War zeitgeist, they are only one conceptualisation of civil 
society and as many scholars suggest, the promotion of this model of civil society carries 
with it the risk of depoliticisation and technicization (Hann, 2002, Howell and Pearce, 
2001, Kaldor, 2003). Moreover, some scholars have criticised the normativity of the neo-
Tocquevillian conceptualisation of civil society arguing instead that the nature of civil 
society is far more important than the existence of civil society alone (Bayart, 1986, 
White, 2004) and that that the presence of civil society does not necessarily lead to 
democracy. Nord for instance writes, ‘Civic activism may well be the bedrock of 
democratic life, but not all civil societies, however dense and vibrant, give birth to 
democratic polities’ (Nord, 2000: xvi).  
In addition to the neo-Tocquevillian conceptualisation of civil society, there is an 
alternative philosophical tradition which stresses the contestatory function of social 
organisation beyond the state and which was influential among Eastern European 
dissidents, such as Vaclav Havel and Adam Michnik in the 1980s (Edwards and Foley, 
2001: 6). In this alternative tradition, which is associated with the Italian Marxist Antonio 
Gramsci, civil society is conceptualised as an ‘ethical political sphere of freedom’ 
(Bobbio, 1988: 87) or as the ‘superstructural sphere’ where hegemonic ideologies are 
introduced and where consent is both ‘produced’, but equally where consent can be 
‘subverted and overthrown’ (Chandhoke 1995: 150). For Gramsci, each social site 
becomes a site for power relations and through micro-processes and continuous struggle, 
‘slow molecular changes’ lead to wider shifts within society and the political sphere 
(Chandoke 1995: 155). 
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Habermas meanwhile envisages the public sphere as a space where people discuss 
matters of mutual concern and learn about others’ opinions (Habermas, 1996). In 
opposition to de Tocqueville’s vision in which public opinion was treated more as ‘a 
compulsion toward conformity than as a critical force’, for Habermas, the public sphere 
is the arena for rational critical debate (Habermas, 1992: 133). Although Habermas saw 
this potential in the ideal model of the public sphere, he also expressed concern with the 
colonisation of the ‘lifeworld’ by late capitalism which he believed undermines its 
progressive potential (Howell and Pearce 2002: 57). While these political 
conceptualisations of civil society have been influential among scholars, as Edwards and 
Foley argue, they were often ignored or ‘actively excluded’ by policy makers and donors 
who considered them to be ‘divisive’ (Edwards and Foley 2001: 6). 
The research on civil society in Armenia has examined how civil society has 
developed from the late Soviet period to the present (Abrahamian, 2006, Abrahamian, 
2001) and analysed its role in development (Babjanian 2008), conflict resolution 
(Ghaplanyan, 2010) as well as democracy building (Ishkanian, 2008/2012). While there 
was an nascent civil society in the late 1980s, which is well documented by Abrahamian 
(2001, 2006) following independence in Armenia, as in a number of other former 
socialist countries, the numbers of NGOs grew rapidly in the 1990s, but this growth in 
NGO numbers did not lead to greater civic activism or participation (Counterpart 
International, 2010, Transparency International Anti-Corruption Center, 2011) and there 
are very low levels of public trust toward NGOs (Caucasus Research Resource Center, 
2010). NGOs’ lack of strong connections to local grassroots groups and the wider public 
has meant that they have often been perceived with scepticism and suspicion of being 
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externally oriented ‘grant-eaters’ who are driven by the interests and concerns of Western 
donors  (Ishkanian, 2008/2012). 
While the civic initiatives which have emerged in recent years in Armenia are not 
directly referencing this alternative tradition or model of civil society, they are explicitly 
rejecting the neo-Tocquevillian-inspired model of civil society that was promoted by 
donors in the 1990s which led to the growth of formal, professionalised NGOs in 
Armenia and which emphasised service delivery and non-confrontational forms of 
advocacy and campaigning (World Bank, 2004). The activists embrace a more political 
understanding of civil society and in their bid to ‘reinterpret’ (veraimastavorel)1 civil 
society,  they are not only creating new social spaces for activism but also new  
understandings and practices of citizenship.  
While there has been much work on civil society and NGOs, there has been 
relatively little attention paid by scholars on the subject of citizenship in the former 
socialist countries and how understandings and practices of citizenship might be 
changing in the post-Soviet period (Salmenniemi, 2010, Thelen et al., 2011, Yalçin-
Heckmann, 2012). In one such study, Yalçin-Heckmann examines how ordinary residents 
in the South Caucasus countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia conceptualise 
citizenship. Drawing on Marshall’s (Marshall, 1950) seminal work on citizenship, Yalçin-
Heckmann argues that in the South Caucasus, social citizenship is ‘one of the principle 
means through which citizens encounter the state, actively practice their citizenship 
rights, and claim entitlements for having been worker-citizens of the former Soviet state’ 
                                                 
1 The verb ‘veraimastavorel’, which does not translate well into English, literally means ‘to give a new 
meaning and a new interpretation’ to something BARATYAN, N. R., YERZNKYAN, Y., LAZARYAN, A., 
HAMBARTSUMYAN, N. & TER-POGHOSYAN, I. 2002. Armenian - English Dictionary, Yerevan, 




(Yalçin-Heckmann, 2012, p. 1727). Whereas at the time of her study, she found ‘no 
obvious and observable social movement for citizenship’ (Yalçin-Heckmann, 2012, 1725) 
in the South Caucasus, the emergence and growth of civic initiatives in Armenia 
challenges that finding in that civic initiatives in Armenia are creating new subjectivities, 
spaces for activism, and practices and understandings of citizenship. 
While the respondents in Yalçin-Heckmann’s study had direct experience of the 
Soviet system and notions of what it meant to be a ‘good citizen’ in the Soviet context 
(Salmenniemi, 2010), the activists in the civic initiatives I studied, many of whom were 
born in the 1980s and 1990s, had very little or no direct experience of the Soviet system. 
And their understandings of citizenship are informed by ideas, including human rights, 
individual responsibility, active citizenship, and participation, that were introduced and 
promoted as part of the post-Soviet democracy building programmes (Salmenniemi, 
2010). However, as I demonstrate, civic activists are not only drawing on these ideas but 
they are also adapting, modifying, and reinterpreting them.   
As mentioned in the introduction, similar types of groups have emerged in other 
former Soviet countries, most notably in Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.  
However, as yet, there are few academic studies of these groups.  One such study, by 
Evans, focuses on the struggle in Russia by activists to save Khimki Forest. One of his 
findings is that while Russians are ‘skeptical about the goals of nongovernmental 
organizations and reluctant to take part in any activities in the public sphere’, nonetheless 
people are mobilizing around specific issues that ‘arise out of threats to the self –interest 
of large numbers of people’ (Evans Jr., 2012: 240).  Meanwhile Lutsevych, who 
examines the rise of civic movements in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, argues that there 
12 
 
has been a backlash against the ‘Western funded NGO-cracy’ and that ‘new civil voices’ 
have emerged which use ‘mass mobilization strategies and social media’ to address issues 
ranging from the protection of historical buildings and public squares as well as taxation 
and labour rights (Lutsevych, 2013: 1). The Armenian civic initiatives I discuss in this 
article share similarities with these groups in that they also distance themselves from 
Western-funded or what’s locally called, ‘traditional’ (avantagan) NGOs and the latter’s 
tendency to focus on issues that are popular with Western donors.  Moreover, similar to 
other new civic movements in the former Soviet space, they also rely on direct action and 
mass mobilization strategies  and make extensive use to social media to organise and 
mobilise.  Before turning to discuss the Protect Trchkan and Save Mashtots civic 
initiatives  in the next section, I discuss the governance context against which civic 
initiatives are emerging and reacting. 
The Governance Context and the Rise of Civic Initiatives 
Currently, Armenia is considered a ‘semi-consolidated authoritarian regime’ 
(Freedom House, 2014) or what some have called a ‘managed’ or ‘imitated democracy’ 
(Zolyan, 2010: 84). ‘Managed democracy’ (upravlyayemaya demokratiya) is a phrase that 
was introduced by the Russian authorities in the early 2000s and is increasingly used to 
describe the situation in other former Soviet states (e.g., Armenia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan etc.) where the formal/procedural institutions and practices of democracies 
(e.g., elections) exist but are controlled and managed by the authorities (Colton and 
McFaul, 2003). The Republican Party of Armenia (Hayastani Hanrapetakan 
Kusaktsutyun – HHK), which has been in power since 1998, presides over a political 
system which is characterized by corruption, clientalism, the absence of the rule of law 
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and an independent judiciary (Cheterian, 2009, Stefes, 2006). Opposition political parties 
have failed to build a credible and serious challenge to the regime’s hold on power 
through elections and apart from the 1991 presidential elections, all subsequent post-
Soviet period elections (both presidential and parliamentary) have been beset by claims 
of vote rigging and violations and many have been followed by massive street 
demonstrations and protests (Zolyan 2010). 
While the Armenian Government has not introduced the oppressive legislation found 
in other former Soviet countries, including Azerbaijan, Russia, Uzbekistan, and others, it 
has supported the perpetuation of a discourse which accuses NGOs of being ‘grant eaters’ 
who are driven by foreigners (Ishkanian, 2008/2012). The government has until now 
tolerated the protests by civic initiatives and not attempted to actively suppress their 
activities.  In some instances, which I discuss later, it has also attempted to co-opt these 
movements and to use them as evidence of the regime’s democratic credentials.   
The boundaries dividing political and economic elites are porous and blurred as many 
oligarchs also hold posts in the government or are Members of Parliament (MPs). 
Powerful oligarchs including Gagik (Dodi Gago) Tsarukyan, Samvel (Lfik Samo) 
Aleksanyan, and Mher (Tokhmakhi Mher) Sedrakyan are all MPs, while Hovik (the 
Mouse) Abrahamyan is the current Prime Minister. Their political positions not only 
grant them immunity from prosecution, but also provide them with the opportunity to 
adopt and alter legislation in order to serve their economic interests (Ishkanian et al., 




In the post-Soviet period, the rise of oligarchs and their monopolization of the 
economy have been accompanied by growing levels of poverty and inequality. Currently, 
over 35% of Armenians live in poverty [i.e., live on less than $3/day] (World Bank, 2013, 
Armenian Statistical Service, 2012, National Statistical Service of Armenia, 2012). 
According to a UNDP report, in its transition to a market economy Armenia experienced 
a ‘precipitous fall in the average standard of living and a dramatic increase in inequality 
in the distribution of income and wealth’ and the ‘proportion of the population living in 
poverty has risen to unprecedented levels’ (Griffin et al., 2002: ii). The authors of the 
report go on to write, ‘Where once poverty was uncommon, today it is widespread’ and 
demonstrate that inequality is not limited to consumption and wages, but there is 
inequality in access to healthcare, education and other services (Griffin et al., 2002: ii). 
Moreover, the country is beset by very high levels of corruption and according to 
Transparency International, corruption in Armenia is ‘endemic and widespread, 
permeating all levels of society’ with the public administration, particularly the judiciary, 
the police and the health sector, very vulnerable to corruption (Transparency 
International, 2014). 
This is the socio-economic and political context in which civic initiatives are 
emerging and that which they criticise and seek to transform. 
Two Successful Civic Initiatives 
Protect Trchkan Waterfall Civic Initiative 
 
Trchkan Waterfall is located in the Lori region in northern Armenia. On 7 April 2010, the 
Ministry of Nature Protection adopted Decision Number 179A of the Public Services 
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Regulatory Commission, granting Robshin LTD a license to build a hydroelectric station 
(HES) at the top of the waterfall. When the construction of the HES began in September 
2011, activists, who were part of Save Teghut civic initiative, established the Protect 
Trchkan Waterfall civic initiative so as to prevent the construction of the HES. They 
argued that government officials who had granted the license to Robshin LTD had 
violated the law by ignoring the fact that Trchkan waterfall was included among the 
recognised water landmarks of the Republic of Armenia. Citing the illegality of the 
construction, activists from the newly created Protect Trchkan Waterfall civic initiative 
held a protest on 8 September 2011 in front of the Ministry of Nature Protection in 
Yerevan and simultaneously created a Facebook page to expand the network of 
supporters. Within two weeks, the initiative’s Facebook page had over 5000 followers 
and more than 10,000 people had signed a statement circulated by the group condemning 
the construction of the HES. Following a second demonstration in front of the Ministry of 
Nature Protection, a group of twelve activists, including both men and women all in their 
mid-20s and early 30s, set up a protest camp adjacent to the waterfall which they 
continuously occupied from 25 October – 3 November 2011. The camped protestors 
received support and encouragement from the residents of adjacent villages as well as 
supporters in Yerevan and diaspora Armenians who could follow the protests via 
Facebook, YouTube and Live Streaming technology. During the period of encampment, a 
number of human rights and environmental NGOs based in Yerevan, Gyumri and 
Vanadzor, which were not involved in the direct action, provided material support and 
solidarity to the protestors at the camp including issuing statements to the press, etc. The 




2 announced that the construction of the HES at Trchkan Waterfall was to be 
temporarily halted pending further investigation and there would be consultation on how 
it could be built in a more ecologically friendly and sustainable manner. By the end of 
December 2012, construction had been entirely called off and Trchkan Waterfall was 
granted ‘protected’ status. 
The phenomenally rapid success of the Trchkan civic initiative captured the 
attention of the public and attracted many new supporters. One male civic activist from 
the Save Mashtots civic initiative explained, ‘After Trchkan people saw that success 
could be achieved through concerted, collective action’ (Gevork, interview 13 October 
2012, Yerevan). While another activist stated, ‘After Trchkan, I realised that if you don’t 
do anything, then you deserve what you get in life. So you should either try to change 
things or don’t speak and complain when things are bad.’ (Rosa, interview 11 October 
2012, Yerevan). Shortly after the victory of the Trchkan activists in November 2011, the 
occupation and protests aimed at saving Mashtots Park began in February 2012. 
Save Mashtots Park 
The Save Mashtots Park mobilization began on 11 February 2012 when two 
young civic activists, one of whom had been one of the camped protestors in Trchkan, 
walked up to construction workers in Mashtots Park and told them they did not have the 
right to build the boutiques in a public park because a public consultation and 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) had not be conducted. A row ensued and the 
activists turned to Facebook and began calling people to Mashtots Park. Over the 
following three months, from 11 February until 1 May 2012, activists occupied the park 
                                                 
2 Tigran Sargsyan, no relation to President Serzh Sargsyan, resigned from office on 3 April 2014 without 
citing a specific reason.  
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on a daily basis. The initiative’s immediate aim was to save Mashtots Park from being 
cemented over for the construction of boutiques, but the larger objective was to critique 
the policies and decision-making procedures, which have consistently put the interests of 
powerful oligarchs and corporations ahead of people and the environment. Despite 
numerous freedom of information requests lodged by activists, the names of the boutique 
owners has never been disclosed by the Yerevan Mayor’s office. But according to 
information obtained by some of the activists, the boutiques are said to have belonged to 
state officials and two oligarchs, one of whom is the well-known oligarch nicknamed 
Khujuj (Curly) Edo and the other is the brother of former Yerevan mayor Gagik 
Beglaryan (who is better known as Chornii Gago [Black Gago]). 
 This was hardly the first instance in which oligarchs had taken over, legally or 
illegally, public spaces for private use. Therefore, for the activists, their protest and 
occupation of Mashtots Park was as much about process (for example consultations, 
EIAs) as about actual policy. Activists argued that their goal was to advance an agenda, 
which encourages civic participation, respect of rule of law, and sustainable development 
(Wallace, 2012). 
While occupying Mashtots Park, the activists organized concerts, exhibitions, 
theatrical performances, and even a 'funeral' for the fictional 'Olig Garkhian' (that is Mr 
Oligarch). In the ‘funeral’, a papier-mâché figure of Olig Garkhian was placed in a 
cardboard coffin, which was then paraded around the streets of central Yerevan followed 
by lamenters and drummers. The activists walked behind the funeral cortege handing out 
leaflets describing their demands. On 3 March 2012 activists held an event at the park 
celebrating the Birth of the Self-Determined Citizen (inknoroshvats kakhakatsu tsnunty).  
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Finally, the activists organized and held an Just and Independent Civic Court in 
which they examined the legality of the boutiques’ construction (Institute for Democracy 
and Human Rights, 2013). Prior to organizing the civic court, the activists had made 
numerous attempts to meet with the Yerevan Mayor’s office and to have their case heard 
in court.  Following the ‘inaction’ of the authorities, the civic court was convened 
on 13 March 2012 with the mandate ‘to examine the problem of the seizure, theft and 
privatization of public property and national wealth in our state.’ (Institute for 
Democracy and Human Rights, 2012) [emphasis in original]. 
The opening statement read, 
We, RA [Republic of Armenia] citizens and residents,3 are implementing our 
constitutional rights and duties and being the masters of this public space, the 
masters of our town and our state, we have demanded that our servants, the 
representatives of the city and other bodies, perform their constitutional functions 
and responsibilities, for which they are paid by the public. They have not given a 
clear and legal response to our clear and lawful demand for a long time now, but 
have avoided it, trying to complicate or prolong the process. (Institute for 
Democracy and Human Rights, 2012). 
 
The ‘verdict’ reached by the Just and Independent Civic Court found that the municipal 
government was obliged to dismantle the boutiques and restore the park to its previous 
form, adding that if this ‘verdict’ was not carried out in 10 days, the activists would begin 
dismantling the boutiques themselves.  
    While the Save Mashtots Park initiative was organized and led by young activists, as 
the parliamentary elections in May 2012 drew near, opposition politicians began to 
descend on the park to presumably engage with the young activists and to carry out the 
‘verdict’ of the civic court.  One group of middle aged male opposition political activists 
from the Sardarapat and Pre-Parliament movements, who called themselves the 'Brigade 
                                                 
3 ‘Residents’ here refers to the diaspora Armenians who have repatriated to Armenia but who do not hold 
Armenian citizenship.  
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of Dismantlers' (apamontazhoghneri brigad), began to come to the park once a week 
from 31 March, carrying tools and dressed as builders. Although their attempts to 
dismantle the boutiques failed, they used the opportunity to make political speeches to the 
crowd.     The presence of the political activists at the park led to intense debates among 
the civic activists. While some welcomed the opportunity to build alliances with political 
parties, other activists argued that this politicization of the protest movement would only 
hurt their cause and allow the government to label them as an opposition political 
movement rather than a broad-based civic movement, which was not affiliated with any 
political party or politician. 
     The situation in the park came to an abrupt end when on 1 May 2012, just a few days 
ahead of the parliamentary elections, President Serzh Sargsyan, accompanied by the 
mayor of Yerevan, visited the park. While touring the park, Sargsyan told the Mayor, 
Taron Margaryan, 'Taron, they don’t look pretty. Dismantle them'. He ordered Margaryan 
to dismantle the boutiques 'as soon as possible' and just like that, the construction was 
halted, the boutiques were dismantled overnight and it appeared as though the activists 
had achieved their aim (Avagyan, 2012; A1+, 2012). 
      But had they really achieved their aims and was this a success for the Save Mashtots 
Park initiative? Yes and no. While the activists achieved their stated aim of halting the 
construction of the boutiques, their larger aims of addressing the failure of the rule of law, 
the impunity of oligarchs, and corruption within the system were not met. I will return to 
the matter of impact later. 
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Self-Determined Citizens?: Redefining civil society and 
citizenship 
A number of respondents explained the emergence and growth of civic initiatives, as a 
new ‘awakening’ (zartonk) in societal consciousness and argued that this was due to both 
the coming of age of a new generation which had not directly experienced life under the 
Soviet regime as well as the availability of new information and communication 
technologies. Indeed, I discovered that the vast majority of activists are people in their 
20s and 30s, thus there does appear to be a generational aspect. And as one of my 
respondents, a representative of a human rights NGO, said,  
I would call this activism an outburst period of the new generation which was not 
born and raised in the Soviet times. This generation is more open minded than the 
previous generations and obviously this new generation is going to have an 
outburst when it experiences injustices (Hayk, Skype interview 27 July 2013).  
 
With regard to the impact of new information and communication technologies, the 
introduction and spread of social media, including Facebook and YouTube, as well as the 
greater availability and affordability of broadband technology which allows for Live 
Streaming, has allowed civic activists to access information more easily and to organise 
and mobilise much more effectively and rapidly. Much has been written about the role of 
social media and its use by young activists in recent protests around the globe (Mason, 
2013, Castells, 2012, Center for Liberation Technology, 2010) and indeed, civic 
initiatives in Armenia also extensively use social media in their campaigns, however, we 
should be wary of exaggerating its impact when there is evidence that social media has 
also been a tool for government surveillance and even provocation (Morozov, 2011). 
Moreover, while the availability of social media may explain how activists are 
organizing, it does not explain why they are rejecting NGO models of advocacy and 
campaigning and are instead choosing to create new spaces for and practices of activism. 
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Civic initiatives, which operate in the public and social spaces that are often referred 
to as the sphere of ‘civil society’ (Bhatt and Seckineglin, 2012), are nevertheless very 
reluctant to embrace the term ‘civil society’. In an effort to differentiate and distinguish 
themselves from ‘traditional’ NGOs, civic initiatives engage in a process of re–
interpreting existing terms and inventing a new vocabulary to describe their work. As one 
activist, Rosa, who is involved in the Save Teghut civic initiative and was also involved 
in the Save Mashtots Park action said, ‘There is very little trust in Armenia toward civil 
society because that word, ‘civil society’ (kakhakatsiakan hasarakutyun) is used by 
international donors, such as the US embassy.’ She went on to add, 
If we [the civic initiatives] were to describe ourselves as “civil society”, then the 
Government would immediately say, “Oh they are grant-eaters” (grantagerner en)”. 
Of course we are part of civil society, but the words “NGO” or “civil society” are so 
compromised so that they are immediately associated, in the minds of many people in 
Armenia, with grant-eaters. For that reason, we must use a different word and avoid 
waving around the red flag, [which is the term ‘civil society’], to describe our 
actions. [Emphasis added] (Interview 11 October 2012, Yerevan). 
 
In order to avoid waving the ‘red flag’ that is civil society, they describe themselves as 
individual citizens and their groups as ‘civic initiatives.’ A respondent from an 
environmental NGO explained, ‘It is not accidental that they [civic activists] refer to 
themselves as ‘citizens’ and ‘civic initiatives’. It is a deliberate choice. They are wary of 
the NGOs and are reluctant to be identified with us [NGOs]’ (Anzhela, interview 2 May 
2012, Yerevan). 
When I interviewed representatives from environmental NGOs, several NGO 
representatives told me that while they admired the young activists for their enthusiasm 
and courage, they believed that their protests were 'too radical'. One respondent who 
works for a local environmental NGO said, 
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The civic initiatives are freer than us [NGOs].   We can’t make such radical 
statements and we must act in a sensible [professional] manner. They are freer to 
express themselves and often do so rather boldly and crudely (Martiros, interview 
14 October 2012, Yerevan). 
 
As one male activist who was involved in the Protect Trchkan civic initiative and the 
Save Teghut civic initiatives said the following with regard to how environmental NGOs 
engage with civic initiatives on mining issues.  He said, 
The issue is that some international environmental NGOs that are already working 
in Armenia, such as X NGO, have transformed from the robust organisations that 
they are on a global level into ‘frightened baby chicks’ (kurkuri tsak) in Armenia. 
They are afraid to say anything that will offend the Armenian Government. As if 
that was not bad enough, they also try to silence our protests [around mining] and 
to dictate to activists what we should or should not do. That is why we don’t work 
with them (Suren, Skype interview 11 January 2013). 
 
Despite the differences in organisational and operational styles, this does not mean that 
there are no connections between civic initiatives and professionalised NGOs. On the 
contrary, individual NGO representatives often join civic initiatives in their personal 
capacity and in certain instances, for example in the case of Trchkan discussed earlier, 
NGOs provide advice and support to activists. That said, these NGO employees/activists 
also recognise the limits of NGOs and describe their participation in civic initiatives as a 
matter of personal choice and expression of their citizenship and not part of their NGO 
work. Many activists who are employed by NGOs argue that NGOs are often constrained 
in their actions and reluctant to engage in what would be construed as confrontational or 
radical forms of action. Instead, they argue that NGOs prefer to engage in less 
contentious forms of advocacy and campaigning, including writing letters to officials, 
conducting research, preparing reports, and organising conferences. For instance, Narine, 
who works for a human rights NGO and was active in the Save Mashtots civic initiative 
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and has also been involved in the Save Teghut civic initiative for several years, expressed 
frustration with NGOs in the context of Mashtots Park and a belief that activists can 
actually be more effective than NGOs. She said,   
[NGOs] were not able to, [and] did not seek to demonstrate activeness in the 
street. The fact showed that some things are changed by young active citizens, 
who are more persistent, more mobile. They are free from documentation, from 
writing grants, reports; they are free (Narine Skype interview 5 April 2013). 
 
Meanwhile, Erik, who works for an international NGO and was active in Save Mashtots 
Park stated at the start of our interview ‘I am not speaking to you as a member of staff 
from X NGO. I actually got into a little bit of trouble [at my job] for writing a newspaper 
article about our movement’. For Erik, Mashtots Park was about ‘values’ and ‘redefining’ 
citizenship. He said, 
It’s about redefining what it means to be a citizen…the biggest problem in 
Armenia is that the average citizen doesn’t see the solutions to today’s problems 
within themselves. So whatever is happening now, the core of it is taking 
responsibility for the problems and saying here on out I am going to maximize my 
agency as a citizen and do whatever I possibly can to make sure that this bad thing 
doesn’t happen...The two biggest values for us are solidarity and self-
organisation. Those are the two things that are pointed out in every single 
meeting, in every single action. (Erik, Skype interview 6 August 2013)  
 
Beyond rejecting the traditional NGO model of advocacy and campaigning that 
was introduced by Western donors in the 1990s, the activists involved in civic initiatives 
encourage and promote new forms of civic activism and   citizenship which recognise 
that individuals have rights as well as responsibilities towards their communities and the 
wider society.  Activists speak about the responsibility of individual citizens and argue 
that people should not expect ‘others’ to act for them. As scholars have demonstrated, the 
concept of ‘individual responsibility’ is a key feature of ‘neoliberal rationality’ (Ong, 
2007: 4) which stresses the self-responsibility of individual subjects (Rose, 1996, Harvey, 
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2007). However, in the context of civic initiatives in Armenia, individual responsibility is 
not concerned with getting people to maximize their economic self-interests, but rather 
for individuals to exercise responsibility through acting in solidarity with others for the 
greater common good. Thus activists say to people, ‘You are a citizen; you have a voice, 
exercise it’.  
Beyond activist circles, however, such understandings of civic activism and 
citizenship are not widely shared. A number of activists spoke about having to continually 
clarify that they were acting in their own personal capacity as citizens and not as 
members or employees of NGOs.  For example, one male activist from Save Mashtots 
Park civic initiative told me, ‘When people on the street approached us and asked, ‘What 
NGO are you from?’ We replied, ‘We are not from any NGO. We are citizens of the 
Republic of Armenia’’ (Gevork, interview 13 October 2012, Yerevan). In a pamphlet 
printed by activists from the We Are Owners of the City [Menk Enk Ays Kakhaki Deruh] 
civic initiative, which was also involved in the occupation at Mashtots Park, it states: 
We are individual citizens…Our civic initiative is not a NGO and does not 
receive any financial assistance (We are the Owners of This City, 2013)[emphasis 
added] 
The pamphlet has a section titled ‘What You Can Do’ in which the group makes 
nine recommendations to individual citizens. These range from familiarising oneself with 
the Armenian Constitution to encouraging citizens to approach construction workers 
working in public parks and squares and demanding to see their building permits (We are 
the Owners of This City, 2013). But as one prominent, young female activist from 
Yerevan who has been involved in a number of environmental civic initiatives explained, 
it is not so easy to get people to exercise agency and to take responsibility. She said,  
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People call me all the time and say they are cutting down trees or destroying such 
and such. I tell them, “Thanks for letting me know, but don’t just call me. You can 
address that problem yourself. Of course I will help you, but it is your yard, your 
community, your park and you must act for yourself as well” (Anush, interview 
18 September 2011). 
In the next section I discuss the challenges facing activists in widening 
participation and impact.  
The Limits of Civil Society: the impact of civic initiatives on 
wider socio-political developments  
 
One reason for the lack of wider participation is the prevailing ‘climate of fear’ 
(vakhi mtnolorty) which was mentioned by many focus group respondents. For instance, 
all the participants in the focus groups we conducted were told that the discussions are 
anonymous, and that their names would not appear anywhere. Even so, at the end of 
some discussions a few participants refused to sign their names, arguing that they feared 
that what they had said to us in the focus group would be leaked and that they could lose 
their jobs. One focus group participant said,  
If you talk about something you don’t like and government officials hear about it, 
you could lose your job. This is what Armenia is. (Female, 18-30, city of Alaverdi). 
But fear is not the only obstacle. A large number of focus group participants said 
they would not join civic initiatives, not because they did not share their concerns, but 
because they did not believe that their actions could lead to change. 
Do you know why this [environmental] movement does not have a massive 
character? Because 70% of our citizens fight for their own survival, it is a struggle 
for the material; their minds are busy only with this. No one thinks they can 
change anything. (Female, 36 and above, Yerevan,) 
While another, much younger focus group respondent said,  
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The sad thing is that we all think we don’t have future in Armenia, most of the 
young people think so. All of us would like to live abroad, to have a good 
education, professional growth, and social security. (Female, 18-35, Yerevan). 
And indeed, many Armenians continue to vote with their feet as emigration continues 
unabated (News.am, 2013, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2010).  
 While scholars recognise the importance of civil society for creating spaces for 
rational critical discourse, participation, and expression, there remain questions of 
whether and indeed, how civil society can lead to social transformation and structural 
changes. For instance, Young writes about the importance of civil society in exposing 
injustices in state and economic power and for making the exercise of power more 
accountable, but goes on to argue that civil society has its limits and that those who wish 
to undermine injustice cannot turn their backs on state institutions (Young, 2000: 8). She 
argues against those who suggest that civil society ‘serves as a preferred alternative to the 
state today for promoting democracy and social justice’ and maintains that ‘state 
institutions have unique capacities for co‐ordination, regulation, and administration on a 
large scale that a well‐functioning democracy cannot do without’ adding that ‘social 
movements seeking greater justice and well‐being’ should work on two fronts (i.e., within 
civil society and at the level of state institutions) (Young 2000: 156). Even Walzer, who 
enthusiastically celebrates the power of civil society, recognises that civil society 
activism is not enough and that in order to achieve changes within society and in the 
political domain, a transformation of the state is required (Walzer, 2003). 
 For the activists their major accomplishments have been introducing new ideas, 
values, and practices, including those of self-organisation, autonomy, and solidarity as 
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well as in opening up issues to greater public scrutiny and debate.  As one activist who 
had been active in Mashtots Park said,  
 
People are trying to live a more collective life; they are trying to establish a 
democratic culture. The collective life means that when I do something, it affects to 
others' as well … People realize that they are the owners of this country. It is a change 
of values for me (Davit, interview Yerevan, 9 May 2012).  
 
However, both activists and other observers recognise that civic initiatives have as yet 
made little impact at the structural, political, or policy levels. One NGO respondent said, 
‘So far, the civic initiatives have been working on an issue tochichni (specific) scale. 
They are not addressing the systemic issues that need to be addressed. You need a 
political movement or a party to address those issues’ (Sirvart, interview 10 October 
2012, Yerevan). Indeed, the lack of impact of the Army in Reality and Save Teghut civic 
initiatives which are addressing violence in the army and mining respectively, 
demonstrates the challenges of using this form of activism to achieve larger objectives 
and in taking on more powerful vested interests (Ishkanian et al., 2013). 
     An academic, who was a supporter of the Mashtots Park civic initiative said,  
Impact is happening on a case by case basis. But to have implications on policy 
conduct and to affect policy making ex ante as opposed to ex post, takes a 
different kind of pressure. It not only takes the grassroots activism to sound the 
alarm and raise the flags, but you also need structures that will identify the 
alternative policies (Shant, Skype interview 25 November 2012). 
 
Indeed, several NGO representatives and representatives from political parties have 
criticized the civic initiatives for being unwilling to engage with political parties. One 
respondent from a diaspora based political organisation said that he recognised that ‘civil 
society is the only outlet for the young for expressing their ideas’ but went on to add,  
My bone of contention with them is the lack of connection between civic activism 
and political activism. There is a rabid paranoia of established politics from the 
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civic activists. And I would blame both sides for that…But it also creates a ceiling 
in terms of their effectiveness of policy change (Raffi, Skype interview 23 
November 2012). [Emphasis added] 
 
While civic activists recognise that they may have hit the so-called ‘ceiling’ of 
effectiveness, they are also wary of becoming too closely aligned with political parties for 
fear of being co-opted or exploited. The fear of co-optation is not unfounded. During the 
2013 presidential campaign, President Serzh Sargsyan attempted to represent the 
activists’ victory in Mashtots Park as his own and in one of his election campaign videos, 
Sargsyan is presented as the defender of civil society and the rights of citizens, instead of 
as the leader under whose administration oligarchic capitalism, inequality, and corruption 
have persisted and expanded. But it is not only Sargsyan who has attempted to 
appropriate the success of the movement in order to bolster his democratic credentials, 
opposition political parties and movements, such as Sardarapat and the Pre-Parliament 
have also claimed responsibility for the success of Mashtots Park. As one activist said,  
The attitude of opposition political parties towards civic activism is very consumerist. 
They want to tap into and benefit from the political and social capital accumulated by 
civic activists. For example, there is a video where representatives from the Pre-
Parliament claim to not only have taken part in the developments of Mashtots Park, 
but they claim that they were ‘coordinating’ it (Narine, Skype interview 5 April 
2013). 
 
Narine went on to add that this approach did not inspire trust in political parties or 
their leaders.  The concern that political parties will exploit their actions for their own 
political gains is of concern to many activists, but following the successes of Trchkan and 
Mashtots Park, disagreements have begun to emerge among activists over how and 
indeed whether to scale up. Some activists are for building alliances with political parties 
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while others argue that this will lead to co-optation and de-radicalisation and instead 
advocate maintaining their distance from political parties. 
One strategy, which has been utilised, is that activists have sought to build links with 
diaspora Armenians. As one female activist from the Save Mashtots Park civic initiative 
told me,  
If we try to build links with global environmental movements, the Government will 
accuse us of ‘working for foreigners’. So our only option is to work with diaspora 
Armenians because while they live abroad, they are not considered ‘foreigners’ (odar) 
(Gayane, interview 11 May 2012, Yerevan). 
 
Both the Protect Trchkan Waterfall and Save Mashtots Park civic initiatives had 
strong support from various diaspora Armenians living in Europe and North America who 
followed the protests on Facebook and YouTube. Diaspora Armenians signed petitions, 
wrote open letters to the Prime Minister and other government officials (including the 
Minister of the Diaspora) and even collected funds to purchase tents and other camping 
equipment for the protestors (Raffi). One such open letter to the Minister of Diaspora 
Hranush Hakobyan states, 
The most sacred duty and responsibility of the armed forces of any country, is to 
defend the borders of the said country and protect the safety and the security of its 
citizens. It is not, to control, silence or terrorize innocent citizens protesting the illegal 
use of public spaces, i.e. Mashtotz Park, Teghud Forest or the unlawful and criminal 
exploitation of the resources of the country, causing long term damage to the 
environment and the ecology of our Homeland. (Misakyan, 2012) 
 
While there is no evidence to show that diaspora support has had any influence on the 
authorities, it is clear that activists are gaining recognition from the international donor 
community. 
For instance, in June 2012, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton joined the 
US and British Embassies in Armenia, as well as the EU Delegation and the Counterpart 
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International NGO to ‘highlight the contributions of Armenia’s civil rights activists’ 
involved in Save Mashtots Park civic initiative to the ‘promotion of human rights’ by 
awarding them the Universal Rights Award (Embassy of the United States, 2012). 
Moreover, in March 2014 the World Bank recognised the Save Teghut activists as 
‘stakeholders’ in mining (Save Teghut Civic Initiative, 2014, World Bank, 2014). 
While some civic activists celebrated the award arguing that this demonstrated 
that they had become a force to be reckoned with, others argued that the attention and 
publicity would only open them up for criticism and charges of being ‘grant-eaters’ and 
under the influence of foreign powers (focus group with activists on 9 October 2012, 
Yerevan). Indeed, success comes at a cost, as a NGO respondent said, ‘The government 
recognises that the public is beginning to respond positively to the new activist groups 
and applauding them for their perseverance and courage. So it’s now begun a concerted 
campaign to denigrate and label activists as being this, that or the other’ (Sirvart, 
interview 10 October 2012). 
Activists recognise that if they are to achieve more structural and political level 
changes, they will need to widen participation, fight the reigning fear and apathy and  
encourage a greater sense of agency among their fellow citizens,  but it remains to be 
seen how civic initiatives will develop and what form activism will take in the future.  
Can and will the Yerevan-based activists build links with communities and individuals 
outside the capital so as to widen participation? Will they continue to remain as 
autonomous, loosely organised, informal groups or will they begin to ‘scale-up’ their 
efforts by either institutionalising and becoming NGOs themselves or by creating 
alliances with NGOs or  political parties? On my last field visit in November 2013, I 
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discovered that some changes were already taking place. For example, some activists 
involved in the on-going Save Teghut civic initiative (2007 – present), which is opposed 
to the opening of the Teghut copper-molybdenum mine, had created a new radical NGO 
while others were forming a trade union to organise miners and some of the activists had 
joined a newly created (December 2013) opposition political party called Civil Contract, 
which is led by the former political prisoner and current MP Nikol Pashinyan. Meanwhile 
several activists who had been involved in the Save Mashtots Park civic initiatives 
created a website in the autumn of 2013 called ‘Political Discourse’, with funding from 
the German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,  where they publish original articles about  political 
philosophy, civil society, and other social and economic issues.  In addition to  original 
articles, they also publish Armenian translations of the writings of scholars such as 
Jurgen Habermas, David Graeber, Susan Strange, and others.  Their aim is to ‘introduce 
new ideas so as to shift the political discourse and thinking’ (Diskurs, 2014).  
Conclusion 
In this article I examined the emergence of civic initiatives in Armenia and 
focused on two civic initiatives, Save Mashtots Park and Protect Trchkan Waterfall. I 
analysed why civic initiatives reject NGO forms of advocacy and campaigning and how 
they are creating new spaces for mobilization and understandings and practices of 
citizenship, civic activism, and civil society more broadly.  
My objective was to consider what the emergence of civic initiatives tells us about 
the development of civil society and the changing of understandings and practices of 
citizenship in Armenia in the post-Soviet period.  I argued that civic activists are rejecting 
the neo-Tocquevillian-inspired model of civil society that was promoted by donors in the 
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1990s and which emphasised service delivery and non-confrontational forms of advocacy 
and campaigning. Instead, I demonstrated how  the activists are embracing a more 
political understanding of civil society and embracing a concept of citizenship which 
emphasises self-organisation, independence, and solidarity.  I argued that while civic 
initiatives focus on specific issues, their actions are driven by broader concerns around 
corruption, oligarchic capitalism, the absence of rule of law and the disillusionment with 
politics as usual.  
I also considered whether civic initiatives have been able to influence policy and 
wider socio-political developments in Armenia. I argued that while activists involved in 
civic initiatives have achieved small yet symbolically significant victories, thus far they 
have  not been able to widen participation beyond the capital nor, more significantly, have 
they been able to achieve structural changes or had an impact on addressing politically 
sensitive issues such as violence in the army or mining. The government, as I discussed, 
has thus far tolerated civic initiatives and not initiated a crackdown on activists, but that 
there have also been attempts by officials  to appropriate the success of the civic 
initiatives in order to demonstrate and boost the regime’s democratic credentials.  
 Civic initiatives have introduced new ideas as well as understandings and 
practices of citizenship and civil society which are important, but it is clear that achieving 
substantive change at the structural and political levels and on wider policy issues will 
not be easy or quick; it will take time, perseverance and perhaps a less exacting attitude 
towards scaling up and building alliances with other stakeholders including progressive 
NGOs, opposition political parties, and where appropriate (e.g., on the issue of mining), 
global civil society activists and networks.  
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Although the activists at Mashtots Park who celebrated the birth of the Self-
Determined Citizen did not draw on this, but the ideas of self-determination and 
autonomy can be traced back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Neuhouser, 2011). Rousseau 
conceptualized autonomy as ‘citizens joining together to make laws for themselves that 
reflect their collective understanding for the common good’ and autonomy in this sense 
required citizens to possess the ‘capacity for independent, self-determined judgment’ 
(Neuhouser 2011). I would argue that it remains to be seen how  civic initiatives will 
develop and how the Armenian government will respond in the future before we begin to 
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